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Our Battle-Tested Wartime President
George Bush often proclaims himself to be an able commander
in the war on terror. But should the American people want proof of
just how able he is, they need look no further than the quality of
leadership he displayed on the day that war started — September 11, 2001. For on that day they would see a man hampered by
ineptitude, hamstrung by indecision, preoccupied with self-protection,
and beset by the sort of consummate timidity that ill befits a
Commander-in-Chief. They
would also see a man who would not let the truth get in the way of a
good story. But what Americans needed to see on that day was a
President who was adept, decisive, selfless, honest, and courageous.
For on September 11, they would have to endure a disaster without
precedent: the first major terrorist attack on American soil. At four seconds short of 8:47 AM, United Airlines Flight 11
crashed into Tower One of the World Trade Center, setting off an
explosion sufficient to blow away the face of a mountain. It entered
the mostly glass structure between the 93rd and 98th
floor; none of the 1,344 people above the 91st floor got
out alive. At that precise moment, Mr. Bush was over a thousand miles
away, just outside Sarasota Florida, sitting in the back of his
specially modified, armor-plated Cadillac limousine, complete with
bullet-proof glass. He was en route to the Emma E. Booker Elementary
School where he would be visiting a class of second graders for what
was essentially a “photo op.” At about 8:53 AM, seated in a separate car in the
presidential motorcade, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer took a call.
“Oh my God, I can’t believe it,” he exclaimed. “A plane has
just hit the World Trade Center!” Fleischer said to alert others in
the car as to what had just happened. Around 8:58, when the motorcade had come to a stop,
Fleischer, along with Advisor Karl Rove and photographer Dan Bartlett,
briskly stepped over to Bush to tell him about the horrendous plane
crash. “The President was surprised,” according to Fleischer.
“He thought it had to be an accident.” Remarkably, Bush did not immediately reach back into the
limousine for the secure, STU-II phone to make a non-interceptible
call to the Secretary of Defense, or the Administrator of the FAA, or
the Director of the CIA, or any members of the National Security
Council. Instead, at approximately 9 AM, he entered the school and
slipped into a vacant classroom. There he used an unsecured phone to
make one call to his national security advisor, Condoleeza Rice. Unbeknownst to Rice, the United States had already gone to
full “battle stations” alert; hundreds within the Pentagon, NORAD,
and the FAA already knew this. But Bush was totally unaware of this
fact since he chose to make only the one phone call. Also known to many in the Pentagon, NORAD, and the FAA was
that several fighter planes had already been scrambled to intercept
three airliners suspected of having been hijacked. For these hijacked
planes to be shot down, however, the President would have to order it.
But since Bush’s sole communicant was the singularly unaware Rice,
he was not now asked to give that order. The pilots in those jets
could do nothing. His single phone call over, Bush emerged from the vacant
classroom somewhere around 9:03. At 9:02:54, a second plane, United
Flight 175, plowed straight into Tower Two of the World Trade Center.
In addition to the damage the plane did upon initial impact, its
nearly full fuel tanks created a horrendous fireball followed by a
deadly explosion. Bush would later make claims about all these events that
would be difficult to believe as well as to understand. On two
separate occasions, he said that he was “sitting outside the
classroom, waiting to go in and I saw an airplane hit the tower —
the TV was obviously on and I used to fly myself and I said
‘There’s one terrible pilot. It must have been a horrible
accident.’ ’’ You will also find this account on the official
White House web site. But no video of the first crash was yet on the air; Bush
could not have seen the first plane hit Tower One. Video of that crash
would not make its appearance until later in the day. The only crash
he could have seen that early was the second. But if Bush saw the
second crash, the question becomes, why didn’t he know it was more
than pilot error? What is the likelihood of two pilots accidentally
hitting the two towers of the World Trade Center within 16 minutes of
each other? Furthermore, as the Guardian
put it, “Why
is it obvious that an elementary school would have a TV set in the
corridor?” Nevertheless, at 9:04 Bush instantaneously made an
executive decision. He would partake of the priorities of
insignificance and go ahead with the photo opportunity. And thus did the President of the United States enter
Sandra Kay Daniel’s second grade classroom to address the assembled
seven year-olds. For the first two or three minutes, the class went
through a reading drill. When the drill was over, the eager students
reached into their desks for The
Pet Goat, the book they intended to read before the President. It was precisely at this moment, 9:06 AM, that Bush’s
Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, entered the room. Walking up to the
President, Mr. Card leaned over and spoke into Bush’s ear: “A
second plane has hit the second tower. America is under attack.”
Regardless of whether he’d really seen it before on television, the
President now knew of the second plane crash. He also knew bad
piloting was not behind it all and that America was now the object of
enemy assault. Amazingly, aside from displaying alternating looks of
dismay, disbelief, bewilderment and incomprehension, Bush initially
did nothing. He asked no questions of Card. He did not ask who the
attackers were, whether there might be more attacks, or what military
plans had been taken against them. He did not ask to speak to anyone
— the Secretary of Defense, the Vice President, or the Director of
the CIA. More surprisingly, he did not stand up, excuse himself, and
leave the room to find a phone and become involved with, much less
lead, America in defending itself against this attack. Instead he sat
there, motionless, for a minute or two. Then the Commander-in-Chief, uncomfortably compressed into
a chair designed for a seven year-old, made another executive
decision. He reached for his copy of The
Pet Goat and began to read along with the class. This bizarre tableau went on for some seven minutes. When
the exercise ended, Bush launched into compliment mode. “Hoo” he
said, “these are some really good readers. Very impressive. Thank
you all so much for showing me your skills. I bet they practice, too.
Don’t you? Reading more than they watch TV. Anyone here do that?”
As the hands went up, one need not wonder how Bush would have answered
that question had it been asked of him. Amazingly, Bush seemed in no particular hurry to leave the
classroom. He stopped to answer a few questions, posed for a few
pictures, talked to the teacher, and waited for the press to leave —
a process that took about six minutes. To anyone unaware of what Card
had just told him and what he had been told earlier, Bush seemed as if
he hadn’t a care in the world. He did, however, tell the principal,
Gwen Tose-Rigel, that he would not be able to hold his press
conference in the library as scheduled, that he was needed back in
Washington immediately. At this point, Bush sauntered down to the library, stopping
first in an adjacent room where his staff gave him a quick update.
From that room, he called Rice again. He then called Cheney, who had
already been taken down into a bunker beneath the White House. Another
hijacked plane, American Airlines Flight 77, was at that very instant
headed toward Washington, possibly toward the White House. It would
later crash into the Pentagon at 9:37 AM. At 9:29, Bush arrived at the library where he said there
would be no press conference and that he must leave. About 9:35, Bush
stepped into his limousine and joined the motorcade headed for the
Bradenton Airport, some 3 and ½ miles away. At almost the same moment, national operations manager Ben
Sliney made a decision from the FAA control center in Herndon,
Virginia. He was told that 11 planes in the air could not be reached
and hence, might likely be hijacked. Among these 11 was the errant
flight 77, heading directly towards Washington at “lightning
speed.” Sliney acted. At 9:35, he ordered that all commercial and
private planes in the U.S. already on the ground remain there. Unfortunately, at that moment there were 4,452 planes still
in the air. At 9:57, Air Force One would also be airborne. But before
it took off, Sliney made another decision, in part motivated by the
Pentagon crash. This time, he ordered every plane in the air to land
as soon as feasible, regardless of its destination, something that had
never been ordered before. On his first day on the job, Sliney had
already made history, all before 10 AM. The President’s plane, along
with military aircraft, would not be subject to this order. As reporters on Air Force One later remarked, the plane
flew in long, lazy circles for quite a while, not really going
anywhere. Suddenly the plane banked sharply; at Bush’s order —
with Cheney’s prodding — it began its trip to Barksdale Air Force
Base in Shreveport, Louisiana. While talking to Cheney from the plane,
Bush also gave the “shoot down” order, but said that Cheney would
have the final decision whether or not to execute it. Bush would not be going back to Washington immediately as
he promised the elementary school principal. Nor would he be following
the example of Lyndon Johnson, who bravely returned to the nation’s
capital late on November 22, 1963, after the Kennedy assassination.
Johnson had landed near D.C. despite stories that the U.S. Government
was about to be overtaken by the Russians who had missiles aimed at
Washington. Once on the ground at Andrews Air Force Base, Johnson gave
a short speech, bringing a much needed modicum of consolation and
solace to a shattered nation. As to why Bush decided not to return to Washington but
rather to hopscotch America, the press was told that Air Force One and
the President himself had been threatened in a message delivered by
someone who knew the airline communication codes. But this threat
proved to be a fabrication. CBS reported “the call never
happened”; on the next day, the Washington
Post ran the headline “White House Drops Claim of Threat to
Bush.” At 11:45, Air Force One arrived at Barksdale Air Force
Base. Here Bush was met by a multitude of men in flak jackets carrying
automatic weapons as well as a group of armored vehicles that
surrounded the plane. Bush was immediately taken in a blue Caravan to
Building 245, the headquarters of the Eighth Air Force. As he traveled
the short route, Bush could see several signs displaying in large
black print “DEFCON DELTA,” the highest state of military alert. Bush was then taken to a secure location several stories
underground. There he wrote out on a napkin a short speech that he
later taped. When it was broadcast at 1:30, millions of Americans saw
the President for the first time, four hours after the traumatic
catastrophes that had earlier punctuated the morning. But by 1:30,
Bush would be back on Air Force One, destination initially undecided. The speech, all 219 words of it, did not go over well.
According to Washington Post reporters
Dan Balz and Bob Woodward: “When Bush finally appeared on television
from the base conference room, it was not a reassuring picture. He
spoke haltingly, mispronouncing several words as he looked down at his
notes.” Writing for the mainstream USA
Today, Judy Keene said that Bush “looked grim. His eyes were red
rimmed.” As an administration official would later admit, “It was
not our finest moment.” But the lackluster speech was not all that the press was
criticizing. Many reporters were asking when Bush was coming back to
Washington. Presidential aide, Karen Hughes, currently at the FBI, was
asked by reporters where Bush was and when he might be returning. By
way of reply, she turned around and walked out of the room. Tim
Russert, host of Meet the Press,
remarked that the nation was now absent the leadership of its
President at a most critical time. Even the London Daily
Telegraph weighed in: “If he stays away, he could be accused of
cowardice.” Once the destination had been decided, Bush was heading in
the opposite direction from Washington, this time to Offutt Air Force
Base in Omaha Nebraska. Accompanying his plane were two F-16 fighters.
Offutt was chosen partly because it was the home of the United States
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the successor to the Cold War mainstay,
the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The other reason for choosing Offutt
was its two-story command center, located three stories below ground
— a place from which World War III could be fought. Bush was taking as few risks as possible where his safety
was concerned. Landing at Offutt Air Force Base at 2:50 PM, Bush was met
by an eight-car motorcade. Within 15 minutes, Bush was ensconced
within Offutt’s command center, a cavernous space with a multitude
of desks, a large screen showing the status of military forces all
over the world, and a distinctly unmistakable Dr.
Strangelove ambience. Shortly thereafter, using teleconferencing screens, Bush
began a meeting with his top aides in Washington. Perhaps the most
pertinent question, considering the day’s events, was Bush’s query
to CIA Director George Tenet: “Who do you think did this to us?”
Tenet answered immediately but tentatively: “Sir, I believe it’s
al-Qaeda. We’re doing the assessment, but it looks like, it feels
like, it smells like al-Qaeda.” Bush responded sharply, “Get your
ears up.” The meeting ended shortly before 4:30 PM. Aside from the short, 219-word taped speech, the American
people had by this time neither heard nor seen their President all
day, nor did they know where he was. For this, Bush was receiving
criticism even from the Right. William Bennett, former Secretary of
Education under Ronald Reagan and drug czar under George Bush Senior,
stated it was imperative that George Bush return. “This is not
1812. It cannot look as if the President has been run off,” which,
in essence, he had been, “or it will look like we cannot defend our
most important institutions,” which, in essence, we could not. By this time, 4:30, nearly every Government office
building, including CIA and NSA headquarters, as well as the White
House offices and the halls and offices of Congress, had long since
been evacuated. Nearly all federal workers had been sent home.
Washington began to take on the look of a ghost town, with the
exception of those still fighting the fires at the Pentagon. At this point, the only problem preventing the
President’s return seemed to be a commercial jetliner traveling from
Spain to the U.S. It was giving off an emergency signal. From over a
loudspeaker at Offutt came a voice directed at Bush, “Do we have
permission to shoot it down?” Bush replied: “Make sure you got the
I.D. You follow this closely to make sure.” As earlier with Cheney,
Bush was transferring the final “shoot down” decision to someone
else. But it turned out the alarm was simply a mistake. Following
orders, the airliner turned around and landed. The day had passed
without a single innocent plane being shot down from the sky. Bush was informed that it had landed, and now — with
nearly the entire Western Hemisphere virtually free of aircraft of any
sort — he returned to Air Force One, leaving Offutt for the flight
back to Washington. He was escorted by two F-15 fighters and one F-16.
Landing uneventfully at Andrews Air Force Base, Bush took the
traditional helicopter flight to the White House. It
was now 7 PM. At 8:30, Bush spoke live to the public, talking for only
five minutes; he did not give that much better a speech this time than
he did the first. Most found it largely lacking in substance and his
manner largely devoid of any quality that gave the listener comfort. What was most notable in this speech were the words: “We
will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these
acts and those who harbor him.” It was the start of the Bush
Doctrine that would eventually evolve into, “You’re either with us
or you’re against us,” a philosophy that would eventually help
alienate many of America’s friends and nearly all of its traditional
allies. Around 9 PM, Bush met with his full National Security
Council; an hour later he met with his top advisors. Bush and his
advisors had already decided bin Laden was behind the attacks. Tenet
reportedly said that al-Qaeda and the Taliban were one and the same.
That this was a vast oversimplification was beside the point: the
justification for invading Afghanistan was already in place. So apparently was the justification for invading Iraq. Only
hours later, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asked that plans for just
such an invasion be drawn up. |
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